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Abstract
We use a randomized experiment and a structural model to test whether monitoring
and financial incentives can reduce teacher absence and increase learning in rural India.
In treatment schools, teachers’ attendance was monitored daily using cameras, and
their salaries were made a nonlinear function of attendance. Absenteeism by teachers
fell by 21 percentage points relative to the control group, and children’s test scores
increased by 0.17 standard deviations. We estimate a structural dynamic labor supply
model and find that teachers responded strongly to the financial incentives, and that
this alone can explain the difference between the two groups. Our model is used to
compute cost-minimizing compensation policies.
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1 Introduction
Many developing countries have expanded primary school access. However, these improve-
ments have not been accompanied by improvements in school quality. For example, in India,
a nationwide survey found that 65 percent of children enrolled in grades 2 through 5 in gov-
ernment primary schools could not read a simple paragraph (Pratham, 2006). These poor
learning outcomes may be due, in part, to teacher absenteeism. Using unannounced visits
to measure attendance, a nationally representative survey found that 24 percent of teach-
ers in India were absent during school hours (Chaudhury, et al., 2005).1 Thus, improving
attendance rates is neccessary to make “universal primary education” a meaningful term.
Solving the absenteeism problem poses a significant challenge (see Banerjee and Duflo
(2006) for a review). In many countries, teachers are a powerful political force, able to resist
attempts to enforce stricter attendance rules. As such, many governments have shifted to
instead hiring “para-teachers.” Para-teachers are teachers that are hired on short, flexible
contracts to work in primary schools and in non-formal education centers (NFEs) that are
run by non governmental organizations (NGOs) and local governments. Unlike government
teachers, it may be feasible to implement greater oversight and incentives for para-teachers
since they do not form a entrenched constituency, they are already subject to yearly renewal
of their contract, and there is a long queue of qualified job applicants. Thus, providing
para-teachers with incentives may be an effective way to improve the quality of education,
provided that they can teach effectively.
In this paper, we use both experimental and structural methods to empirically test
whether the direct monitoring of the attendance of para-teachers (referred to simply as
teachers in the rest of the paper), coupled with high-powered financial incentives based on
their attendance, improves both teacher attendance and school quality.
The effect of incentives based on presence is theoretically ambiguous. While simple labor
supply models predict that incentives should increase effort, there are cases where they can
be ineffective. First, the incentives may not be strong enough. Second, the incentive may
crowd out a teacher’s intrinsic motivation to attend school (Benabou and Tirole, 2006).
Finally, some teachers, who previously believed that they were required to work every day,
may decide to stop working once they have reached their target income for the month (Fehr
and Goette, 2002).
Even if incentives increase teacher attendance, it is unclear whether child learning levels
1Teachers have some official non-teaching duties, but this absence rate is too high to be fully explained
by this.
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will actually increase. Teachers may multitask (Holmstrom and Milgrom, 1991), reducing
their efforts along other dimensions.2 Such schemes may also demoralize teachers, resulting
in less effort (Fehr and Schmidt, 2004), or may harm teachers’ intrinsic motivation to teach
(Kreps, 1997). On the other hand, incentives can improve learning levels if the main cost of
working is the opportunity cost of attending school and, once in school, the marginal cost
of teaching is low. In this case, an incentive system that directly rewards presence would
stand a good chance of improving child outcomes. Thus, whether or not the incentives can
improve school quality is ultimately an empirical question.
To address these questions, we study a teacher incentive program run by the NGO Seva
Mandir. Seva Mandir runs single-teacher NFEs in the rural villages of Rajasthan, India.
Teacher absenteeism is high, despite the fact that Seva Mandir tries to reduce it by berating
frequently-absent teachers and threatening dismissal for repeated absences. In our baseline
study, evaluated in August 2003, the absence rate was 44 percent. In September of 2003,
Seva Mandir gave teachers in 57 randomly selected program schools a camera, along with
instructions to have one of the students take a picture of the teacher and the other students
at the start and close of each school day. The cameras had tamper-proof date and time
functions, allowing for the collection of precise data on teacher attendance that could be
used to calculate teachers’ salaries. Each teacher was then paid according to a nonlinear
function of the number of valid school days for which they were actually present, where a
“valid” day was defined as one for which the opening and closing photographs were separated
by at least five hours and both photographs showed at least eight children. Specifically, they
received Rs 500 if they attended fewer than 10 days in a given month, and Rs 50 for any
additional day attended that month. In the 56 comparison schools, teachers were paid a
fixed rate for the month (Rs 1000) and were reminded (as usual) that regular presence
was a requirement of their job, and that they could in principle be dismissed for repeated,
unexcused absences.
The program resulted in an immediate and long-lasting improvement in teacher atten-
dance rates in treatment schools, as measured through monthly unannounced visits in both
treatment and comparison schools. Over the 30 months in which attendance was tracked,
teachers at program schools had an absence rate of 21 percent, compared to 44 percent
baseline and the 42 percent in the comparison schools.
2This is a legitimate concern as other incentive programs (based on test scores) have been subject to mul-
titasking (Glewwe, Ilias and Kremer, 2010), manipulation (e.g., Figlio and Winicki, 2005; Figlio and Getzler,
2006) or outright cheating (Jacob and Levitt, 2003). On the other hand, Lavy (2009) and Muralidharan and
Sundaraman (Forthcoming) find very positive effects of similar programs.
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While the reduced form results inform us that this program was effective in reducing
absenteeism, they do not tell us what the effect of another scheme with a different payment
structure would be. Moreover, they do not allow us to identify the response to the financial
incentive separately from a possible independent effect of collecting daily data on absence.3
To answer these questions, we estimate a structural dynamic model of teacher labor supply
using the daily attendance data in the treatment schools. Our estimation strategy leverages
the fact that the financial incentive for a teacher to attend school on a given day changes
with the number of days previously worked in the month and the number of days left in
the month. This is because teachers have to attend at least 10 days in the month before
they begin to receive the incentive and the implied shadow value of working changes as the
teacher builds up the option to work for Rs 50 per day at the end of the month.
In order to understand the effect of the financial and monitoring incentives on teacher
attendance, we estimate two complementary structural models of the teachers’ labor supply
functions. The two models are conceptually similar in that they both model the dynamic
decision process facing teachers as they accumulate days worked towards the bonus at the end
of the month. Both approaches allow for unobserved heterogeneity at the teacher level, but
differ in their treatment of serial dependence in opportunity cost of working. In the first set
of models, the opportunity cost is allowed to depend on whether the teacher attended work
on the previous day. The second set of models posits that the opportunity cost to working
is subject to an autocorrelated shock that follows an AR(1) process. The two models deliver
similar results. A nice feature of the experiment is that the incentives shift discontinuously
with the change in month, which is the source of the identification of the responsiveness
to the bonus. As a robustness check, we combine the spirit of the regression-discontinuity
approach with the structural model by estimating a model with a three-day sample window
around the change in month. These results are similar to those from the earlier models.
To our knowledge, this is one of the few papers to estimate dynamic labor supply decisions
with unobserved heterogeneity and a serially correlated error structure.4 Stinebrickner (2000)
discusses some of the econometric issues associated with this problem. Three related papers
are Bound, Stinebrickner, and Waidman (2010), Sullivan (2010), and Stinebrickner (2001).5
3Another possibility is that the existence of this scheme discourages teachers in the control group. This
would lead us to overestimate the impact of the program.
4See Aguirregabiria and Mira (2010), Keane, Todd, and Wolpin (2011), and Todd and Wolpin (2010) for
recent surveys of the estimation of dynamic choice structural models.
5Stinebrickner (2001) also estimates a dynamic model of teacher labor supply, although the dynamic
problem they solve is whether a teacher works in a particular year as a function of the wage that year. Wilbert
van der Klaauw (2005) and Stinebrickner (2001) also study dynamic labor supply decision of teachers.
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We find that teachers are responsive to the financial incentives: our estimates suggest
that the elasticity of labor supply with respect to the level of the financial bonus is between
0.20 and 0.30 in our preferred specifications. In most specifications for the structural model,
we do not use the control group data. Therefore, as a check on the model, we can test
whether the model accurately predicts teacher presence in the control group. Models that
include both serial correlation and teacher heterogeneity do well in this out of sample test:
when we set the incentive to zero, it closely predicts the difference in attendance in the
control group. In addition, the model accurately preducts number of days worked under a
new incentive system initiated by Seva Mandir after the experiment.
The idea of hold out samples for validation has been used in several papers, staring with
at least McFadden (1977) (see Keane, Todd and Wolpin (2010)). A smaller number of papers
use randomized control experiments to validate a structural model. Wise (1985) estimates
a model of housing demand on a control group data, and validates the model using the
forecast of the effect of a housing subsidy. More recently, Todd and Wolpin (2006) used data
from the PROGRESA program, a conditional cash transfer program in Mexico. Using only
the control villages, they estimated a structural model of fertility, school participation and
child labor. The model was validated by comparing the predicted effect of PROGRESA to
the experimental estimates of program effects. Lise, Seitz and Smith (2005) use data from
the Self Sufficiency Program in Cana to validate a search model of the labor market. As
in Keane and Moffitt (1998), we estimate the model using the treatment sample because
the incentive schedule provides useful variation for model identification, and use the control
sample for out-of-sample model validation. Other papers which combine structural methods
and experimental data (without using the control group for out of sample validation) include
Attanasio, Meghir, and Santiago (Forthcoming) and Ferrall (2010).
An advantage of the structural model is that the parameters can be used to estimate the
effects of other possible rules (see Todd and Wolpin (2010) for different applications of this
method to development policy). We use the parameters of the model to compute the optimal
incentive scheme for a given number of days worked on average in a month. We calculate
that Seva Mandir could achieve the same number of days worked (17) by increasing both
the bonus cutoff to 21 days and the bonus to 75 Rupees per day while saving 193 Rupees
per teacher per month, an average cost savings of 22 percent.
Although we find that teachers are sensitive to the financial incentives, we see no evi-
dence of multitasking. When the school was open, teachers were as likely to be teaching
in treatment as in comparison schools, suggesting that the marginal costs of teaching are
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low conditional on attendance. Student attendance when the school was open was similar
in both groups; thus, the students in the treatment group received more days of instruction.
A year into the program, test scores in the treatment schools were 0.17 standard deviations
higher than in the comparison schools. Two and a half years into the program, children from
the treatment schools were also 10 percentage points (or 62 percent) more likely to transfer
to formal primary schools, which requires passing a competency test.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the program and evaluation strat-
egy. The results on teacher attendance are presented in Section 3, while the estimates from
the dynamic labor supply model are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents the results
on other dimensions of teacher effort, as well as student outcomes. Section 6 concludes.
2 Experimental Design and Data Collection
2.1 Non-formal Education Centers
Since the enactment of the National Policy on Education in 1986, non-formal education
centers (NFEs) have played an important role in India’s drive toward universal primary
education. They have been the main instrument for expanding school access to children in
remote and rural areas. They have also been used to transition children who may otherwise
not attend school into a government school. Several million children are enrolled in NFEs
across India. Similar informal schools operate throughout most of the developing world
(Bangladesh, Kenya, etc.).
Children of all ages may attend the NFE, though, in our sample, most are between 7 and
10 years of age. Nearly all of the children are illiterate when they enroll. In the setting of
our study, the NFEs are open six hours a day and have about 20 students each. All students
are taught in one classroom by one teacher, who is recruited from the local community and
has, on average, a 10th grade education. Instruction focuses on basic Hindi and math skills.
The schools only have one teacher; thus, when the teacher is absent, the school is closed.
2.2 The Incentive Program
Seva Mandir runs about 150 NFEs in the tribal villages of Udaipur, Rajasthan. Udaipur is a
sparsely populated, hard to access region. Thus, it is difficult to regularly monitor the NFEs,
and absenteeism is high. A 1995 study (Banerjee et al., 2005) found that the absence rate
was 40 percent, while our first observation in the schools included in our study (in August
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2003, before the program was announced) found that the rate was 44 percent.
Before 2003, Seva Mandir relied on occasional visits to the schools, as well as reports by
the local village workers, to monitor teacher attendence. They then use bi-monthly teacher
meetings to talk to delinquent teachers. Given the high absence rate, they were aware that
the level of supervision was insufficient.
Therefore, starting in September 2003, Seva Mandir implemented an external monitoring
and incentive program on an experimental basis. They chose 120 schools to participate, with
60 randomly selected schools serving as the treatment group and the remaining 60 as the
comparison group.6 In the treatment schools, Seva Mandir gave each teacher a camera,
along with instructions for one of the students to take a photograph of the teacher and the
other students at the start and end of each school day. The cameras had a tamper-proof
date and time function that made it possible to precisely track each school’s openings and
closings.7 Rolls were collected every two months at regularly scheduled teacher meetings,
and payments were distributed every two months. If a camera malfunctioned, teachers were
instructed to call the program hotline within 48 hours. Someone was then dispatched to
replace the camera, and teachers were credited for the missing day.
At the start of the program, Seva Mandir’s monthly base salary for teachers was Rs 1000
($23 at the real exchange rate, or about $160 at PPP) for at least 20 days of work per month.
In the treatment schools, teachers received a Rs 50 ($1.15) bonus for each additional day
they attended in excess of the 20 days (where holidays and training days, or about 3 days
per month on average, are automatically credited as working days), and they received a Rs
50 fine for each day of the 20 days they skipped work. Seva Mandir defined a “valid” day as
one in which the opening and closing photographs were separated by at least five hours and
at least eight children were present in both photos. Due to ethical and political concerns,
Seva Mandir capped the fine at Rs 500. Thus, salaries ranged from Rs 500 to Rs 1,300
(or $11.50 to $29.50). In the 56 comparison schools, teachers were paid the flat rate of Rs
1,000, and were reminded that regular attendance was required and that they could be in
principle dismissed for poor attendance. However, no teacher was fired during the span of
6After randomization but prior to the announcement of the program, 7 of these schools closed. The
closures were equally distributed among the treatment and controls schools, and were not due to the program.
We thus have 57 treatment schools and 56 comparison schools.
7The time and date buttons on the cameras were covered with heavy tape, and each had a seal that would
indicate if it had been tampered with. Fines would have been imposed if cameras had been tampered with
(this did not happen) or if they had been used for another purpose (this happened in one case).
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the evaluation.8
2.3 Data Collection
Vidhya Bhawan (a consortium of schools and teacher training institutes) and J-PAL collected
the data. We have two sources of attendance data. First, we collected data on teacher
attendance through one random unannounced visit per month in all schools. By comparing
the absence rates obtained from the random checks across the two types of schools, we can
determine the program’s effect on absenteeism.9 Second, Seva Mandir provided us with
access to the camera and payment data for the treatment schools.
We collected data on teacher and student activity during the random check. For schools
that were open during the visit, the enumerator noted the school activities: how many
children were sitting in the classroom, whether anything was written on the blackboard, and
whether the teacher was talking to the children. While these are crude measures of teacher
performance, they were chosen because each could be easily observed before the teachers
could adjust their behavior. In addition, the enumerator also conducted a roll call and noted
whether any of the absent children had left school or had enrolled in a government school,
and then updated the evaluation roster to include new children.
To determine whether child learning increased as a result of the program, the evaluation
team, in collaboration with Seva Mandir, administered three basic competency exams to
all children enrolled in the NFEs in August 2003: a pre-test in August 2003, a mid-test in
April 2004, and a post-test in September 2004. The pre-test followed Seva Mandir’s usual
testing protocol. Children were given either a written exam (for those who could write) or
an oral exam (for those who could not). For the mid-test and post-test, all children were
given both the oral exam and the written exam; those unable to write, of course, earned a
zero on the written section. The oral exam tested simple math skills (counting, one-digit
addition, simple division) and basic Hindi vocabulary skills, while the written exam tested
for these competencies plus more complex math skills (two-digit addition and subtraction,
multiplication and division), the ability to construct sentences, and reading comprehension.
Thus, the written exam tested both a child’s ability to write and his ability to handle material
requiring higher levels of competency relative to the oral exam.
8Teachers in the control schools knew that the camera program was occurring, and that some teachers
were randomly selected to be part of the pilot program.
9Teachers understood that the random checks were not linked with an incentive. We cannot rule out the
fact that the random check could have increased attendance in comparison schools. However, we have no
reason to believe that they would differentially affect the attendance of comparison and treatment teachers.
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2.4 Baseline and Experiment Integrity
Pre-program school quality was similar across the treatment and control groups prior to the
program onset. Before the program was announced in August 2003, the evaluators visited
41 schools in the treatment group and 39 in the comparison.10 Panel A of Table 1 shows
that the attendance rates were 66 percent and 64 percent, respectively. This difference
is not statistically significant. Other measures of school quality were also similar prior
to the program: in all dimensions shown in Table 1, the treatment schools appear to be
slightly better than comparison schools, but the differences are always very small and never
significant.
Baseline academic achievement, as measured by the pre-test, was the same for students
across the two types of schools (Table 1, Panel E). On average, students in both groups
appeared to be at the same level of preparedness before the program. There is no significant
difference in either probability to take the written test or scores on the written tests.
3 Results: Teacher attendance
3.1 Reduced form results: Teacher Behavior
The effect on teacher absence was both immediate and long lasting. Figure 1 shows the
fraction of schools found open on the day of the random visit, by month. Between August
and September 2003, teacher attendance increased in treatment schools relative to the com-
parison schools. Over the next two and a half years, the attendance rates in both types of
schools followed similar seasonal fluctuations, with treatment school attendance systemati-
cally higher than comparison school attendance.
As Figure 1 shows, the treatment effect remained strong even after the post-test, which
marked the end of the formal evaluation. Since the program had been very effective, Seva
Mandir maintained it. However, at the end of the study, they only had enough resources to
keep the program operating in the treatment schools. The random checks conducted after
the post-test showed that the higher attendance rates persisted at treatment schools even
after the teachers knew that the program was permanent, suggesting that teachers did not
alter their behavior simply for the duration of the evaluation.
10Due to time constraints, only 80 randomly selected schools of the 113 were visited prior to the program.
There was no significant (or perceivable) difference in the characteristics of the schools that were not observed
before the program. Moreover, the conclusion of the paper remains unchanged when we restrict all the
subsequent analysis to the 80 schools that could be observed before the program was started.
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Table 2 presents a detailed breakdown of the program effect on absence rates for different
time periods. On average, the teacher absence rate was 21 percentage points lower (or
about half) in the treatment than in the comparison schools (Panel A).11 The effects on
teacher attendance were pervasive—teacher attendance increased for both low and high
quality teachers. Panel B reports the impact for teachers with above median test scores on
the teacher skills exam conducted prior to the program, while Panel C shows the impact
for teachers with below median scores. The program impact on attendance was larger for
below median teachers (a 24 percentage point increase versus a 15 percentage point increase).
However, this was due to the fact that the program brought below median teachers to the
same level of attendance as above median teachers (78 percent).
The program reduced absence everywhere in the distribution. Figure 2 plots the observed
density of absence rates in the treatment and comparison schools for 25 random checks.
The figure clearly shows that the program shifted the entire distribution of absence for
treatment teachers. Not one of the teachers in the comparison schools was present during
all 25 observations. Almost 25 percent of teachers were absent more than half the time. In
contrast, 5 of the treatment teachers were present on all days, 47 percent of teachers were
present on 21 days or more, and all teachers were present at least half the time. Thus, the
program was effective on two margins: it eliminated very delinquent behavior (less than 50
percent attendance) and increased the number of teachers with high attendance records.
A comparison of the random check data and the camera data suggests that, for the most
part, teachers did not “game” the system. Out of the 1337 cases where we have both camera
data and a random check for a day, 80 percent matched. In 13 percent of the cases, the
school was found open during the random check, but the photos indicated that the day was
not considered “valid”, often because the photos were not separated by five hours. There are
88 cases (7 percent) in which the school was closed and the photos were valid, but only 54
(4 percent of the total) of these were due to teachers being absent in the middle of the day
during the random check and shown as present both before and after. In the other cases,
the data did not match because the random check was completed after the school had closed
for the day, or there were missing data on the time of the random check or photo.
One interesting question is whether the effect of the program would be very different
in the long run, because the program would induce different teachers to join schools with
11This reduction in school closures was comparable to that of a previous Seva Mandir program, which tried
to reduce school closures by hiring a second teacher for the NFEs. In that program, school closure only fell
by 15 percentage points (Banerjee, Jacob and Kremer, 2005), both because individual teacher absenteeism
remained high and because teachers did not coordinate to come on different days.
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cameras. As of October 2009, the program was still in place in the same schools (Seva Mandir
has recently extended it to all schools). We monitored the schools for a year, from September
2006 to September 2007. After four years, teacher attendance was still significantly higher
in the camera schools (72 percent versus 61 percent). Thus, this program seems to have a
very long lasting effect on teacher attendance.
3.2 The Impact of Financial Incentives: Preliminary Evidence
The program had two components: the daily monitoring of teacher attendance (which com-
plements Seva Mandir’s usual random checks and reports from village or zonal workers)
and an incentive that was linked to attendance. In addition, a monthly random check was
performed in both treatment and control schools by the research team. However, we believe
that teachers did not perceive that this last check was part of Seva Mandir’s program: it
was performed by a separate team, associated with a different organization, and the in-
formed consent signed by all teachers disclosed that these data would not be shared with
Seva Mandir.
Aside from the financial incentive, teachers may respond to the fact that Seva Mandir
now obtains daily attendance data (what we refer to as “the monitoring effect”), either
because of a fear of being fired if the data reveals that they are absent most of the time,
or because Seva Mandir may punish them for absence. At the bi-monthly teacher trainings,
teacher absence is discussed and Seva Mandir workers berate teachers whom they believe to
be frequently absent. On the other hand, since Seva Mandir continues to inspect treatment
and control schools on a random basis, it is also possible that teachers believe that daily data
on attendance does not increase the chance that they are punished for absence in expectation:
they may believe that one absence found out during a surprise visit would be as costly as
several absences in the detailed data. Whether there is a direct effect of obtaining daily
attendance data (an “increased monitoring effect” ) is thus an open question.
Ideally, to disentangle the effect of the financial incentive from a direct increased mon-
itoring effect, we would have provided different types of monitoring and incentive systems
in different, randomly selected schools. Some teachers could have been monitored daily, but
without receiving incentives. Some could have received a small incentive, while others could
have received a larger one. This was not feasible. However, the nonlinear nature of the
incentive scheme provides us with an opportunity to try to isolate the effect of the financial
incentives, assuming that the effect of the threat of monitoring does not follow exactly the
same time pattern as the incentive. Consider a teacher who, because he was ill, was unable
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to attend school on most of the first 20 days of the 26 days of the month. By day 21,
assuming he has attended only 5 days so far, he knows that, if he works every single day
remaining in the month, he will have worked only 10 days. Thus, he will earn Rs 500, the
same amount he would earn if he did not work any other days that month. Although he
is still monitored (and may worry that if he does not attend at all in a month he may be
punished), his monetary incentive to work in these last few days is zero. At the start of the
next month, the clock is re-set. He now has incentive to start attending school again, since
by attending at the beginning of the month he can hope to be “in the money” by the end of
the month, thereby benefiting from the incentive. Consider another teacher who has worked
10 days by the 21st day of the month. For every day he works in the five remaining days,
he earns Rs 50. By the beginning of the next month, his incentive to work is no higher. In
fact, it could even be somewhat lower since he may not benefit from the work done the first
day of the month if he does not work at least 10 days in that month.
This leads to a simple regression discontinuity design test for whether financial incentives
matter, under the assumption that the teacher’s outside option if he does not go to school
does not also jump discontinuously when the month changes. Figure 3 gives a graphical
representation of the approach. It shows a regression of the probability that a teacher works
if she is in the money by day 21 of the month (with 4 days left), in the last 10 days of that
month and the first 10 days of the next month. We fit a third order polynomial on the left
and the right of the change in month. The figure shows a jump up for teachers who were
not in the money, and no jump for those who were in the money. This is exactly what we
would expect: the change in incentive at the beginning of a month is important for teachers
who were not in the money since, in the data, we see that 65 percent of the teachers who
are out of the money in a month will be in the money the following month. The teachers
who were in the money, however, have a 95 percent chance to be in the money again. In
addition, these teachers value the fact that the first days worked help them work toward the
10 day threshold. Correspondingly, we do not see a sharp drop in presence for the teachers
who had been in the money the previous month.
Table 3 presents these results in regression form. Specifically, for teachers in the treat-
ment group, we created a dataset that contains their attendance records for the first and the
last day of each month. The last day of each month and the next day of the following month
form a pair, indexed by m. We run the following equation, where Workitm is a dummy
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variable equal to 1 if teacher i works in day t in the pair of days m (t is either 1 or 2):
Workitm = α+β1im(d > 10) + γF irstdayt +λ1im(d > 10) ∗Firstdayt + υi +µm + itm, (1)
where 1im(d > 10) is a dummy equal to 1 for both days in the pair m if the teacher had worked
more than 10 days in the month of the first day of the pair, and 0 otherwise. Firstdayt is a
dummy that indicates that this is the first day of month (i.e. the second day of the pair).
We estimate this equation treating υi and µm as either fixed effects or random effects. If
the teachers are sensitive to financial incentives, we expect β to be positive (teachers should
work more when they are in the money than out of the money), γ to be positive (a teacher
who is out of the money in a given month should work more in the first day of the following
month) and λ to be negative and as large as γ (there is no increase in incentive for teachers
who had worked at least 10 days before).12
The results indicate that teachers are more likely to attend school at the beginning of a
month if they were not in the money in the previous month, which we do not see for teachers
who were in the money. This holds after controlling for teacher fixed effects (Column 4),
and even if we restrict the sample to the first and last day of the month (Columns 1 and 2).
These results imply that teachers are responsive to the financial incentives, unless there
are other factors affecting teachers that happen to have exactly the same structure. Shocks
to teachers’ outside options are unlikely to change discontinuously when the calendar month
changes, as no other teacher activity is linked to the calendar month. It is possible that
the daily attendance monitoring could be month specific if teachers were afraid that Seva
Mandir would use the sum of monthly absence to punish or berate the teacher (and possibly
to fire them). In this case, they would also worry about total absence in a month and each
month would be a new beginning. If teachers thought that Seva Mandir’s probability to fire
them changed discontinuously every month that their attendance was less than 10 days it
would be impossible to separate that from the incentives, since it would have exactly the
same time-structure.
We cannot directly test the above case since we do not observe any dismissals in the data
12Note that even with teacher fixed effects, β does not have a causal interpretation, because the shocks
may be auto-correlated. For example, a teacher who has been sick the entire month, and thus has worked
less than 10 days, may also be less likely to work the first day of the next month. However, because when
a month starts and finishes is arbitrary and should not be related to the underlying structure of shocks, a
positive γ indicates that teachers are sensitive to financial incentives, unless there is a common “first day of
the month” effect unrelated to the incentives. A negative λ will be robust even to this effect, since it would
suggest that only teachers who are “out of the money” experience a “first day of the month” effect.
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(let alone teachers’ belief about the probability of dismissal) and we do not have data on
non-penuniary punishment. However, the very fact that no teacher was fired, even though
some teachers were absent almost the entire month, suggests that Seva Mandir takes a
much longer perspective when they consider teacher performance. Indeed, according to Seva
Mandir’s head of the education unit, it is a teacher’s record over an entire year or more that
determines their assessment, not how it is distributed across a month. In fact, in the control
group, we find no relationship between the calendar day in the month and the chance that
we see a teacher at work.13
Furthermore, even if Seva Mandir paid attention to monthly totals, we may expect them
to matter in the opposite direction. Seva Mandir’s official policy is that teachers should
attend at least 20 days per month. Therefore, a teacher who has attended 20 days would
have had no reason to attend any more days from an “official policy” perspective. We expect
the opposite from a financial perspective, and this is also what we observe. Conversely, it
is reasonable to think that Seva Mandir would be particularly likely to punish teachers who
have attended very few days, so that the incentive to attend to avoid displeasing Seva Mandir
should be strong for teachers who have attended less than ten days in a month, precisely
when the financial incentive is the weakest.
Thus, these findings suggest that teachers respond to the incentives. However, without
more structure, it is not possible to conclude what part of the effect of the program was
due to financial incentives per se. To analyze this problem, we set up a dynamic labor
supply model and we use the additional restrictions that the model provides to estimate its
parameters.
4 A Dynamic Model of Labor Supply
We propose and estimate a simple partial equilibrium model of dynamic labor supply, which
incorporates the teacher response to the varying incentives over a month. Let m signify
the month and t the day within the month, where t = {1, . . . , Tm}.14 The teacher’s utility
function over consumption, Ctm, and leisure, Ltm, each day in the month is as follows:
Utm = U(Ctm, Ltm) = βCtm(pim) + (µtm − P )Ltm, (2)
13This result is available from the authors upon request.
14T is 25 in most months. Note that out of the 25 days, there are also several days of training and holidays,
which are automatically credited as days worked for the teachers by the payment algorithm. Our estimation
procedure follows the same rule, but when we report the number of days worked, we report it out of the
days where teachers actually had to make a decision, which is on average 22 days per month.
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where P is the non-pecuniary cost of missing work.15 We have assumed that utility is linear
in consumption and that consumption and leisure are additively separable. This formulation
implies that there will not be a dependency in behavior between months. For example, a
teacher would not decide to work more in one month because she worked little in previous
months.16
Consumption is a function of earned income, pim. Since we assume that there is no
discounting within months and utility is linear in consumption, we can assume that the
teacher consumes all her income on the last day of the month, when she is paid.17 The
parameter β converts consumption, measured in Rupees, into utility terms. We let Ltm
equal one if the teacher does not attend work on that day and zero otherwise.
The coefficient on the value of leisure, µtm, has a deterministic and stochastic component:
µtm = µ+ tm. (3)
The deterministic component, µ, is the difference between the value of leisure and the intrinsic
value of being in school, including any innate motivation. To the extent that teachers value
teaching, or do not want to disappoint students and parents, µ will be less positive. The
stochastic shock, tm, captures variation in the opportunity cost of attending work on a given
day; we assume that it has a normal distribution.
Teachers who do not go to work face two types of penalties. First, an agent who does
not attend school on a particular day is assumed to pay a non-pecuniary cost, P . This term
captures the idea that teachers are verbally rebuked by their supervisors if they have been
found out to be absent during the month: each day of absence makes it more likely that the
teacher is found to be shirking.18 Second, we introduce the possibility that an agent is fired
for poor attendance; we denote the probability of being fired in a given period by pm(t, d),
15Although it is clear that µ and P are not separately identified, we have written the costs and benefits
of missing work in this way to make explicit the difference between these two countervailing forces on the
teacher’s labor decision. Moreover, this makes explicit what we mean by “monitoring effect:”the experiment
may affect P , but we assume it does not affect µ.
16A more general utility function might generate such behavior.For example, if utility was logarithmic,
and teachers could borrow and save between month, they could decide to work little in a particular month,
where the opportunity cost of working is high, and borrow against work in future months. This would make
teacher behavior dependent on the entire history of work so far.
17Alternatively, we can assume that the consumption of pim is spread over the next month. This would
not change the estimation under strong separability between consumption and leisure.
18This way of introducing the non-pecuniary cost is a restrictive functional form assumption, but is nec-
essary to identify the incentive effects. As we explain above, we think that this is a reasonable functional
form.
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where this probability depends on the number of days previously worked, d, by time t in
month m.19 Teachers can be fired in the morning before attending work; they will receive a
one-time payment of F , the outside option to being a teacher. F may potentially be related
to µ, the opportunity cost of working a day (e.g. as a day laborer or tending their field). 20
Letting dm−1 denote the number of days worked in a month, the agent’s income earned
in the last period in the treatment group is given by the following function:
pim = 500 + 50 max{0, dm−1 − 10}. (4)
In the control group, the agent’s income in the last period is Rs 1000, irrespective of atten-
dance. The payoff function is such that teachers who work every day in a month will receive
more in the treatment group than in the control group.
The teacher is assumed to maximize the present value of lifetime utility.21 Thus, control
group teachers face a simple repeated binary choice problem. The Bellman equation for
them every day of the month except the last day is:
Vm(t, d; tm) = pm(t, d) · F + (1− pm(t, d)) max{µ− P + tm + EVm(t+ 1, d; t,m+1),
EVm(t+ 1, d+ 1; t,m+1)}, (5)
where, without loss of generality, we have set the current-period utility of attending work to
zero. The expectation over future value functions is taken with respect to the distribution
of next period’s shock, t,m+1. Agents weigh the marginal change in the possibility of being
fired in future periods against the immediate benefits of skipping work. From Equation 5, it
is clear that µ and P are not separately identified. Therefore, without loss of generality, we
redefine the outside option of not working for the control group as µ˜ = µ−P . µ˜ could easily
be negative if P is large enough. At the end of each day, for t < Tm, t increases by one and
d increases by one if the teacher worked that day. After time Tm, the state variables of time
and days worked reset to zero. On the last day of the month, the value function is almost
19In principle, the probability of being fired can be a function of the teacher’s complete past work history,
but for expositional clarity we consider a specification that only depends on days worked in the current
month. If the probability of being fired depended on the entire work history, the complete life cycle dynamic
programming problem would need to be solved, which would greatly complicate our estimation.
20To slightly anticipate our results below, we are not able to identify F in the data, since we do not observe
any firing in our study period; it will therefore be impossible to estimate it in more detail.
21We assume that there is no discounting within or across months. With idiosyncratic shocks to the outside
option our model is equivalent to one where there is discounting across months but not within months, as
idiosyncratic errors imply that the relevant decision horizon is only the current month.
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identical, with β ∗ 1000 added to the utility of not being fired.
Teachers in the treatment group face a very different decision problem. First, the struc-
ture of the financial incentives induces an additional dynamic concern, as teachers trade off
immediate gratification against the possibility of increased wages at the end of the month.
Second, the cameras provide Seva Mandir with better information on absences, which can
lead to changes in both P , the non-pecuniary cost paid for each absence, and the probability
of being fired pm(t, d). How P should change with the financial incentive is an open question:
on the one hand, Seva Mandir now has perfect information on presence, whereas in the con-
trol group, they visit the school infrequently, so most absences go undetected. On the other
hand, one can imagine that Seva Mandir puts more weight on an absence they find during
one of their inspection visits, and thus that the expected cost of a missed day is similar in
both groups. Moreover, if Seva Mandir feels that teachers are sufficiently punished for not
attending school by the financial penalty, they may lower the non-pecuniary punishment
relative to a situation without incentive, which would lower P . To emphasize that it may
differ from the control group, we denote the punishment in the treatment group by P .
Given this payoff structure, for t < Tm, the value function for each teacher is as follows:
Vm(t, d; tm) = pm(t, d) · F + (1− pm(t, d))
×max{µ− P + tm + EVm(t+ 1, d; t,m+1), EVm(t+ 1, d+ 1; t,m+1)}. (6)
At time Tm:
Vm(Tm, d; Tm,m) = pm(Tm, d) · F + (1− pm(Tm, d))
×max{µ− P + Tm,m + βpi(d) + EVm+1(1, 0; t,m+1), βpi(d+ 1) + EVm+1(1, 0; t,m+1)}. (7)
Note that the term EVm+1(1, 0; t,m+1) enters into both arguments of the maximum op-
erator in Equation 7. Since the expectation of this term is independent of any action taken
today, in the context of the present model we can ignore any dynamic considerations that
arise in the next month when making decisions in the current month. This is useful since we
can think about solving the value function by starting at time Tm and working backward,
which breaks an infinite-horizon dynamic program into a repeated series of independent
finite-time horizon dynamic programs.
Equation 7 also motivates several of our normalizing assumptions. First, the mean of the
shock and the mean level of utility of not working are not separately identified; as a result,
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we set the mean of the shock to be equal to zero. Second, Equation 7 is only identified up
to scale, as multiplying both sides by a positive constant does not change the work decision.
Therefore, we follow a common standard in the discrete choice literature and normalize the
variance of the error term to one. Third, as in Equation 5, µ and P are not separately
identified, and without loss of generality we let P = 0. We note, however, that we can
calculate the difference between µ˜ and µ − P by comparing the predicted attendance rates
across the treatment and control groups when we set the financial incentives to zero. This
difference identifies the effect of the cameras on teacher attendance absent the financial
incentives.
4.1 Estimators
We estimate several specifications of the general dynamic program described by Equations
6 and 7.22 The models vary according to what we assume about µ and the distribution of
. We start with the simplest i.i.d. model, and progressively add observed and unobserved
heterogeneity and allow for auto-correlation in the shock to the outside option, µ. We first
estimate these models using only the treatment group data and, following Todd and Wolpin
(2006), use the means from the control group as an out-of-sample check under the null
hypothesis that the non-pecuniary cost of not working (P ) is the same in the treatment and
the control group. We also estimate a second set of models, where we allow the outside
option to vary with teacher test scores and the average attendance of the control group in
the local block area. The inclusion of block-level control group attendance scores controls
for spatially-correlated shocks to working at the month level, for example, particularly hot
or cold weather makes attending school unattractive to both groups.23 We also allow the
outside option to vary with teacher scores to control for the fact that teachers with higher
scores may be more diligent and thus may work more often.
Before describing the empirical specifications, note that we never observe any teachers
being fired in the data. Therefore, a consistent estimator for pm(t, d) in the model above is
pˆm(t, d) = 0. We therefore proceed as if the teachers perceive the probability of being fired
as being identically equal to zero. This may not be completely correct (e.g. teachers may
believe that if they do not come at all in the year they will be fired). However, no teacher
was ever fired, despite the fact that 2.3 percent of the teacher-months in the treatment data
22We briefly discuss the identification of these models below.
23Formally, this specification embeds a block-level shock, ξtmb, in individual i’s utility of not working,
µitmb = µi + itm + ξtmb. Aside from sampling error, the only reason that control group average attendance
rates would vary spatially is due to ξtmb.
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have recorded zero attendance, with the worst teacher missing 50 percent of the days in 2005.
In the control group, of teachers with 20 or more random checks, 34 percent of teachers were
present 50 percent of the time or less, and 8 percent present less than 35 percent of the time.
For these reasons, we are fairly comfortable positing that the probability of being fired is
equal to zero regardless of work history, at least in the range of work history we observe.
Models with i.i.d. Errors The simplest model that we estimate is one where all agents
share the same marginal utility of income, β, and average outside option of not working, µ,
and the shocks to the utility of not working are i.i.d. We use all of the days in the month in
the estimation by utilizing the empirical counterpart of Equation 6 for t < T :
Pr(work; t, d, θ) = Pr(µ+ tm + EV (t+ 1, d) < EV (t+ 1, d+ 1))
= Pr(tm < EV (t+ 1, d+ 1)− EV (t+ 1, d)− µ)
= Φ(EV (t+ 1, d+ 1)− EV (t+ 1, d)− µ), (8)
where Φ(·) is the standard normal distribution. Each of the value functions in Equation 8
is computed using backward recursion from period Tm. Let wimt be an indicator function
equal to one if teacher i worked on day t in month m, and zero otherwise. The log-likelihood
function for the model without serial correlation in the error terms is then:
LLH(θ) =
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Tm∑
t=1
[wimtPr(work; t, d, θ) + (1− wimt)(1− Pr(work; t, d, θ)], (9)
where each agent is indexed by i, the months they work are indexed by m = {1, . . . ,Mi},
and the days within each of those months are indexed by t = {1, . . . , Tm}. This likelihood is
well-behaved and can be evaluated quickly since numerical integration is not necessary.
Models with Serial Correlation It is reasonable to think that the shock to teacher’s
outside option may be correlated over periods. For example, when a teacher is sick, she may
be sick for a few days. Indeed, serial correlation is prevalent in the data (see online appendix
Table 1). The table shows empirical sequences of days worked in the last five days of a
month by teachers who were already “in” and “out” of the money. These teachers did not
face any dynamic incentives within the month. Intuitively, a lack of autocorrelated shocks
should imply that the distribution of sequences is uniform. While the table with teachers
who are definitely out of the money is inconclusive, due to a small sample size, the table
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for teachers in the money is more clear. The two most frequent sequences are the two most
positively autocorrelated, 00111 and 11100. At the other end of the spectrum, the most
negatively autocorrelated sequence, 10101, is the second least frequent, appearing ten times
less frequently than 00111. This suggestive evidence motivates several specifications that
can handle serial correlation in shocks to the outside option.
Our first approach allows for a simple form of serial correlation in the preference shock
by allowing the value of leisure to depend on the observed lagged absence:24
µmt = µ+ wm,t−1 · γ, (10)
where, as above, wm,t−1 is an indicator function for whether the agent worked in the previous
period. If γ > 0, then we expect that working today increases the probability of working
tomorrow, and therefore days worked or missed will be clustered together in a month. The
likelihood of this model is given by:
LLH(θ) =
N∑
i=1
Mi∑
m=1
Tm∑
t=1
[wimtPr(work; t, d, θ, wm,t−1)
+ (1− wimt)(1− Pr(work; t, d, θ, wm,t−1)], (11)
The probability of working today expressly depends on whether the agent worked yesterday
through Equation 10.25 This specification has the advantage of using all of the data within
a month and is simple to implement. An important advantage is that we can also estimate
this specification using only a narrow window around the change in month. The main source
of identifying variation in this case is that, when the month changes, the financial incentives
to work increase for teachers who were “out of the money” at the end of the previous month,
while they decrease for those who were previously “in the money.” This specification of the
structural model incorporate the spirit of the regression discontinuity approach.
The second approach is to model the shock process as following an AR(1) process:
mt = ρm,t−1 + νmt, (12)
where ρ is the persistence parameter and νmt is a draw from the standard normal distri-
bution. Autocorrelation could be either positive (illness) or negative (teacher has a task
24We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this specification.
25We drop the first month of observations for each teacher since we lack data on whether the teacher
worked the last day in the previous month.
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to accomplish). Irrespective of whether ρ is positive or negative, we can no longer directly
apply the estimator used in the i.i.d. case. This is because mt will be correlated with d, as
teachers with very high draws on mt are more likely to be in the region where d < 10 if ρ
is positive (the converse will be true if ρ is negative). In this case, the expectation is that
 = 0 is invalid, and will bias our estimates of the other parameters.
Our solution is to consider only the sequence of days worked at the beginning of the
month.26 Heuristically, we match the empirical frequencies of sequences of N days worked
at the beginning of each month as closely as possible to the frequencies predicted by our
model. This results in 2N − 1 linearly independent moments, where we have subtracted one
to correct for the fact that the probabilities must sum to one. In our estimation, we match
sequences of length N = 5, which generates 31 moments. In this approach, we treat the
draw of the error term at the beginning of each month as coming from the unconditional
distribution of . This is justified by the observation that true distribution of , conditioning
on the work history in the previous month’s first five days, is essentially identical to the
unconditional distribution after 25 days, even for high ρ values.27 The MSM estimator
does not directly exploit the variation from the discontinuous change in incentives at the
end of the month, as this would require an enormous number of moments. For example,
modeling the sequences across a month with 25 days would require at least sequences of
26 days, generating 226 − 1 = 67, 108, 863 moments. However, the discontinuity and the
nonlinear payment rule is still the source of identification, as expressed through changes in
the probability of working throughout the month as a function of days previously worked.
Observed and Unobserved Heterogeneity We consider two extensions to the speci-
fications above. First, we incorporate observed characteristics into the specification for µ.
We introduce the attendance in the control group in the same geographic block as a shifter
for the outside option, to exploit the informational content of absence in the control group
as the monthly fluctuations in the attendance of control and treatment teachers in Figure 2
suggest that there the behavior of these teachers may be correlated across months.28 We also
allow the teacher’s score on Seva Mandir’s admission exam to shift µ.In our current model,
this will reflect teacher heterogeneity. In a richer model, it will also capture dependency in
behavior between months.
26This model is estimated using the method of simulated moments (see the online appendix).
27Simulation results are available upon request from the authors.
28This suggests, in the framework of our model, that the leisure shock has a component that varies at the
level of the geographic block and the month. The only reason that control group average attendance rates
would differ across blocks in different months (aside from sampling variation) is because of this component.
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Second, we relax the assumption that the outside option is equal across all agents after
conditioning for observed heterogeneity. We estimate specifications with either fixed effects
or random coefficients. In the fixed effects model, teacher types are fixed across time, and we
allow µi to be estimated separately for each teacher.
29 In the random coefficient models, we
estimate two specifications which differ through the distribution of outside options. In the
first specification, µim is drawn anew from a normal distribution each month. In the second
specification, we allow for a mixture of two types, where each type is distributed normally
with proportion p and (1− p) in the population.
4.2 Parameter Estimates
We present the results of these various specifications in Table 4. We present the main
parameters of the model, as well as the implied labor supply elasticity, the percentage increase
in the average number of days worked caused by a one percent increase in the value of the
bonus and the semi-elasticity with respect to the bonus cut-off, and the percentage increase
in the average number of days worked in response to an increase in one day in the minimum
number of days necessary for a bonus.
The first two columns present the results from specifications without any controls for
autocorrelated shocks. Model I estimates a common β and µ for all teachers. The estimate
for β indicates that teachers respond positively to the financial incentives, and will work
more often the closer they are to being in the money. The predicted number of days worked
in the treatment group, 17.23, tracks very closely to the empirical number (17.16). However,
because the estimated opportunity cost of working, µ = 1.564, is greater than zero, this
model vastly under-predicts the number of days that teachers work in the control group.
Teachers in the control group attended on average 12.9 days of work per month; Model I
predicts that they would work 1.31 days. A potential explanation for this result is that
teachers vary in their outside options. Therefore, Model II relaxes the assumption of a
common µ and allows for teacher fixed effects. The estimated β is lower but still positive;
the model still under-predicts attendance in the control group.
It is possible that these models are picking up the confounding effects of serial correlation
in the errors and the financial incentives. Therefore, we next estimate two sets of models,
one set (III, IV, and V) controlling for serial correlation using an AR(1) specification for the
per-period error term, and one set (VI, VII, and VIII) using a shifter for the outside option
29The model with fixed effects has the usual panel model bias, although we expect it will be attenuated
here given the relatively long length of the panel.
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that depends on whether the teacher worked the previous day.
Model III adds the AR(1) error process to Model I. The model estimates imply that
agents respond strongly the financial incentives and finds strong evidence of positive serial
correlation (ρ = 0.422), but the control group prediction is still too low. Model IV adds
in one degree of unobserved heterogeneity by allowing µ to be drawn anew from a normal
distribution at the beginning of each month. These estimates are largely the same as in
Model III, with similar poor results for the control group prediction. Finally, Model V adds
in a second type of unobserved heterogeneity. The outside option is drawn from one of
two normal distributions with a probability p. The estimates from Model V suggest that
there are two types of workers in the data: a majority with a µ less than zero, and a small
proportion (p = 0.024) who have a µ drawn from a much higher distribution. In contrast to
the previous models, this model predicts that most teachers have a negative µ, which implies
that teachers in the control group will work most days. Model V predicts a control group
attendance of 12.9 days per month, which is the same as the empirical attendance rate.30
While Model V finds does an excellent job of predicting attendance in the control group,
one drawback is that it only uses the first five days of data from each month. We also
estimate several models which incorporate serial correlation through a shifter on the outside
option, which depends on whether the teacher worked in the previous period. This is a
simple method of introducing serial correlation into the model while retaining the ability to
use the maximum likelihood approach that can be estimated on the entire data set.
In Model VI, we estimate a random coefficients specification with µ drawn from one
normal distribution and a simple shifter, yesterday, which is added to µ if the teacher did
not work in the previous period. The results of this model are similar to Model V, as β and
the mean of the outside option are estimated to be similar. This model estimates a higher
level of variance in the outside option, and finds that not working yesterday makes it more
likely not to work again today. If a teacher did not work in the previous day, µ is shifted up
by 0.094. Holding the financial incentives fixed, for the average teacher with µ = −0.304,
this implies a decrease in the probability of working in the current period by 4.5 percent.
Model VII is the same specification as Model VI, but uses a restricted sample of three days
30A natural question arises: why stop at two types of heterogeneity? Fox, Kim, Ryan, and Bajari (Forth-
coming) use the same data as an application of an estimator which is non parametric with respect to the
distribution of µ. Their estimator allows for up to 80 discrete types and 40 continuous types for µ, holding
the other parameters at their values from Model V. The results suggest that the mixture of two normals
captures the unobserved heterogeneity extremely well. The Fox, et. al. result suggest that most of the
weight is put on a few points centered around -0.5 and a small diffuse mass of weight around points at higher
levels of µ near 2.0, just as the two-type Model V does.
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on either side of the change in the month to approximate a structural version of a regression
discontinuity model. The counterfactual predictions are similar to Model VI. This is very
reassuring, as this identifying variation in this specification is the sharp change in incentives
around the change in month.
Model VIII is the same specification of Model VI, estimated on the full sample, with
the inclusion of µ shifters for control group attendance in the same geographic block and
teacher test scores. Both variables enter µ positively, so the estimates of −0.132 and −0.005
for attendance and test scores, respectively, imply that teachers work more when teachers in
the control group geographically proximate to them work more and when they have higher
scores, as the negative coefficients on these coefficients imply that the µ decreases with these
two variables. The coefficient on the behavior of the control group teachers is significant,
which is consistent with the parallel seasonal pattern we observed in the reduced form. The
addition of these two controls improves the efficiency of the estimator, but does significantly
change the other parameters nor the predicted number of days worked.
The similarity of results from different estimation methods for the model is encouraging.
Particularly reassuring is the fact that the estimate of β, or all the implied elasticities for the
model, is very similar (ranging between 0.2 and 0.3) when using all the data (Model VI and
VIII), the first five days (Model V), or the three days window (Model VII). This suggests
that the identification based on the shift in incentive at the end of the month drives the
results in all the models. In these three models, the mean outside option (which includes
the punishment for not working) is negative for the majority of the teachers.31 This suggest
that, taking into account the non-pecuniary cost of absence, teachers are willing to work
more than half the days, even without financial incentives. This is consistent with the fact
that the teachers work a little over half the time in the control group.
Note that all these models predict about the same rate of absence in the control group
as we predict when setting the incentive to zero for our treatment group teacher. It suggests
that P is close to P , or that there is no direct impact of the daily monitoring.
4.3 Goodness-of-Fit and Out-of-Sample Tests
To provide a sense of the fit of each model, we report the predicted number of days worked
under each specification. This is not a good test for the models estimated using maximum
likelihood (Models I, II, III, and VI-VIII), which use all the days worked to compute the
parameters of the model, and should therefore do a good job of matching the average number
31In the model with two types, the average outside option is estimated to be -0.375.
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of days worked. However, note that this is not a parameter that our method of simulated
moments estimation tried to match (since we matched only the first five days of teacher
behavior), so it provides a partial goodness of fit metric for these models. Moreover, the
model using the three days window does not match this moment mechanically either.
Figure 4A plots the density of days worked predicted by Model V, and its 95 percent
confidence interval, and compares it to the actual density observed in the data. Since the
estimation is not calibrated to match this shape, as we only used the history of the first five
days in the estimation, the fit is surprisingly good. The model reproduces the general shape
of the distribution, although the mode of the distribution in our predicted fit is to the left of
the mode in the data by one day. The model tends to slightly over-predict the frequency of
17 to 21 days worked and under-predict the frequency between 3 and 10. With the exception
of a small proportion of teachers who work few days in a month, the true distribution lies
comfortably within the 95 percent confidence interval of the prediction.32
A change in the incentive system at Seva Mandir, after the first version of this paper was
written and our model was estimated, provides us with a very nice counterfactual experiment.
In December 2006, Seva Mandir increased the minimum monthly payment to Rs 700, which
teachers receive if they work 12 days or less (rather than 10 days). For each additional day
they work, teachers earn an additional Rs 70 per day. Seva Mandir provided us with the
camera data in the summer of 2007, a few months after the change in policy. The average
number of days worked since January 2007 increased very slightly, from 17.16 to 17.39 days.
The predicted number of days worked for each model is reported in the last row in Table 4.
Here again, our preferred specifications (Models V through VIII) performs well: they predict
between 17.8 and 20.2 days worked under the new incentive scheme, an increase from the
predicted number of days under the main scheme (as in the actual data). Figure 4B shows
the actual distribution of days worked and the predicted one for Model V. The model does
a good job of predicting the distribution of days worked in the out-of-sample test, although
the empirical distribution has more variance than in the original experiment.
4.4 Counterfactual Optimal Policies
A primary benefit of estimating a structural model of behavior is the ability to calculate
outcomes under economic environments not observed in the data. In our case, we are inter-
32As an extra test of goodness of fit, Table 2 in the online appendix shows the empirical moments and
the predicted moments from Model V. Our model generally does well in predicting the patterns of days
worked, under-predicting some of the extreme not work/work sequences (00011, 00111, and 01111) and
over-predicting others (11100 and 11110).
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ested in finding the cost-minimizing combination of the two policy instruments, the size of
the bonus and the threshold to get into the bonus, that lead to a minimum number of days
worked in a month. Using Model V as our foundation, we calculated the expected number of
days worked and expected size of the financial payout for a wide range of potential policies
under our preferred model with autocorrelation and two types of heterogeneity.33 We let the
minimum number of days to obtain a bonus range from zero to 23, which is the upper limit
of days that a teacher could work in any month. At the same time, we varied the bonus paid
for each day over the cutoff from zero to 300 Rp/day in increments of 25 Rp/day. Table 5
shows the lowest-cost combinations of those two policy variables that achieved a minimum
expected number of days worked under Model V.34 The table also shows the gain in test
scores for each of these combinations (calculated using the estimate of the effect of each
extra day on presence and test score, which we estimate below). As with any simulations,
it is worth pointing out that, as we move further from the range of parameters under which
we have estimated the models, the validity may decrease.
This simulation show two general trends: the cost-minimizing cutoff generally decreases
and the bonus increases in the expected number of days worked that the policymaker wants
to achieve. Both of these trends lead to drastically increasing costs as the target increases.
This result directly follows from the model: as we increase the target, the marginal teacher
has increasingly higher opportunity costs of working. This becomes quite expensive, as soon
it is necessary to incentivize the “slacker” teacher types in our sample. It is interesting to
note that for about the same amount of money spent on both the treatment and control
groups in the actual experiment (roughly 1000 Rp/month), teachers under the optimal coun-
terfactual policy would have worked approximately 20 days, an improvement of roughly 16
percent and 56 percent over the treatment group and control group, respectively. The coun-
terfactual calculations show that while the actual intervention successfully increased teacher
attendance, the NGO could have induced higher work effort with approximately the same
expenditure by doubling the bonus threshold and nearly tripling the per-day bonus. This
is due to the fact that teachers in our sample appear to be more likely than not to attend
school even without incentives and be forward looking. A higher threshold avoids rewarding
infra-marginal days, and provides incentives to teachers to work to accumulate the number
33We also calculated the optimal policies under Model VI to test the robustness of our results. Those
policies are reported in online appendix Table 4. The results are roughly comparable to those under Model
V, with an increasing per-day bonus and an inverted-U shaped cutoff function.
34The expected outcomes were subject to a very small amount of variance as we drew model primitives
from their estimated distributions 50 times for each combination of policy instruments.
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of days necessary to get the larger prize.
5 Was Learning Affected?
5.1 Teacher Behavior
Though the program increased teacher attendance and the length of the school day, it would
be ineffective if the teachers compensated for increased attendance by teaching less. We
used the activity data that was collected at the time of the random check to determine what
the teachers were doing once they were in the classroom. Since we can only measure the
impact of the program on teacher performance for schools that were open, the fact that
treatment schools were open more may introduce selection bias. That is, if teachers with
high outside options (who are thus more likely to be absent) also tended to teach less when
present, the treatment effect may be biased downward since more observations would be
drawn from among low-effort teachers in the treatment group than in the comparison group.
Nevertheless, Table 6 shows that there was no significant differences in teacher activities:
across both types of schools, teachers were as likely to be in the classroom, to have used
the blackboard, and to be addressing students when the enumerator arrived. This does not
appear to have changed during the duration of the program.
The fact that teachers did not reduce their effort in school suggests that the fears of
multitasking and loss of intrinsic motivation were perhaps unfounded. Instead, our findings
suggest that once teachers were forced to attend, the marginal cost of teaching must have
been small. This belief was supported by in-depth conversations with 15 randomly selected
NFE teachers regarding their teaching habits in November and December of 2005. We
found that teachers spent little time preparing for class as teaching in the NFE follows an
established routine. One teacher stated that he decides on the activities of the day as he
is walking to school in the morning. Other teachers stated that, once they left the NFE,
they were occupied with household and field duties, and thus had little time to prepare for
class outside of mandatory trainings. Furthermore, despite the poor attendance rates, many
teachers displayed a motivation to teach. They stated that they felt good when the students
learned and liked the fact that they were helping to educate disadvantaged students.
The teachers’ general acceptance of the incentive system may be an additional reason
why multitasking was not a problem. Several months into the program, teachers filled out
feedback forms. Seva Mandir also conducted a feedback session at their bi-annual sessions,
which were attended by members of the research team. Overall, teachers did not complain
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about the principle of the program, although many teachers had some specific complaints
about the inflexibility of the rules. For example, many did not like the fact that a day was
not valid even if a teacher was present 4 hours and 55 minutes (the normal school day is six
hours, but a slack of one hour was given). On the other hand, many felt empowered as the
onus of performing better was actually in their hands: “Our payments have increased, so my
interest in running the center has gone up.” Others described how the payment system had
made other community members less likely to burden them with other responsibilities once
they knew that a teacher would be penalized if he did not attend school. This suggests that
the program may actually have stronger effects in the long run, as it signals a change in the
norms of what teachers are expected to do.
5.2 Child Presence
On the feedback forms, many teachers claimed that the program increased child attendance:
“This program has instilled a sense of discipline among us as well as the students. Since we
come on time, the students have to come on time as well.” Unfortunately, conditional on
whether a school was open, the effect of the program on child attendance cannot be directly
estimated without bias because we can only measure child attendance when the school is
open. For example, if schools that were typically open also attracted more children, and the
program induced the “worst” school (with fewer children attending regularly) to be open
more often in the treatment schools than in the comparison schools, then this selection bias
will tend to bias the effect of the program on child attendance downwards. The selection
bias could also be positive, for example if the good schools generally attract students with
better earning opportunities, who are more likely to be absent, and the “marginal” day is
due to weak schools catering to students with little outside opportunities. Selection bias is
a realistic concern (and likely to be negative) since, for the comparison schools, there is a
positive correlation between the number of times a school is found open and the number of
children found in school. Moreover, we found that the effect of the program was higher for
schools with originally weak teachers, which may attract fewer children.
Keeping this caveat in mind, child attendance was not significantly different in treatment
and comparison schools. In Table 7, we present the child attendance rates in an open school,
by treatment status (Panel A). An average child’s attendance rate was the same in treatment
and comparison schools (46 percent). Excluding children who left the NFE, child attendance
is higher overall (62 percent for treatment and 58 percent for comparison schools), but the
difference is not significant.
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However, treatment schools had more teaching days. Even if the program did not increase
child attendance on a particular day, the increase in the number of days that the school was
open should result in more days of instruction per child. The program’s impact on child
instruction time is reported in Panel B of Table 7. Taking into account days in which the
schools were closed, a child in a treatment school received 9 percentage points (or 30 percent)
more days of instruction than a child in a comparison school. This corresponds to 2.7 more
days of instruction time a month at treatment schools. Since there are roughly 20 children
per classroom, this figure translates into 54 more child-days of instruction per month in the
treatment schools than in comparison schools. This effect is larger than that of successful
interventions that have been shown to increase child attendance (Glewwe and Kremer, 2006;
Banerjee, Jacob and Kremer, 2005). The effect on presence does not appear to be affected
by student ability (proxied by the whether or not the child could take a written test in the
pre-test). While presence increased slightly more for those who could not write prior to the
program (14 versus 10 percentage points), this difference is not significant.
In summary, since children were as likely to attend class on a given day in the treatment
schools as in the comparison schools, and because the school was open more often, children
received significantly more days of instruction in the treatment schools. This finding suggests
that the high teacher absence rate we observed is not likely to be the efficient response to a
lack of interest by the children: if it were the case that children came to school 55 percent
of the time because they could not afford to attend more than a certain number of days,
then we would see a sharp reduction in child attendance in treatment schools on days when
the school was open. On the other hand, we do not see a sharp increase in the attendance
of children in the treatment schools. This suggests that either the teacher absence rate
is not the main cause of the children’s irregular attendance or that the children have not
yet had time to adjust. The latter explanation is not entirely plausible, however, since the
program has now been in place for over two years, and we do not see a larger increase in the
attendance of children in the later periods than in the earlier period.
5.3 Child Learning
Children in the treatment schools, on average, received about 30 percent more instruction
time than children in the comparison schools, with no apparent decline in teacher effort.
Some, however, argue that because para-teachers are less qualified than other teachers, they
are ineffective. Thus, the fact that it is possible to induce them to attend school more often
is not particularly policy relevant. Understanding the effect of the program on learning is
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therefore critical.
5.3.1 Attrition and Means of Mid- and Post-Test
Before comparing test scores in the treatment and comparison schools, we must first ensure
that selective attrition does not invalidate the comparison. There are two possible sources
of attrition.35 First, some children leave the NFEs, either because they drop out of school
altogether or because they start attending regular primary schools. Second, some children
were absent on testing days. To minimize the impact of attrition on the study, we made
considerable attempts to track down the children (even if they had left the NFE to attend a
formal school or had been absent on the testing day) and administered the post-test to them.
Consequently, attrition was fairly limited. Of the 2,230 students who took the pre-test, 1,893
also took the mid-test, and 1,760 also took the post-test. Table 8 shows the attrition rate
in both types of schools, as well as the characteristics of the attriters. At the time of the
mid-test, attrition was higher in the comparison group than in the treatment group. At the
time of the post-test, attrition was similar across both groups, and children who dropped
out of the treatment schools were similar in their test scores to children who dropped out of
the comparison schools.
Table 8 also provides some simple descriptive statistics, comparing the test scores of
treatment and comparison children. The first row presents the percentage of children who
were able to take the written exam, while subsequent rows provide the mean exam score
(normalized by the mid-test comparison group). Relative to the pre-test and mid-test, many
more children, in both the treatment and comparison schools, were able to write by the
post-test. On the post-test, students did slightly worse in math relative to the mid-test
comparison, but they performed much better in language.
Finally, Table 8 also shows the simple differences in the mid- and the post-test scores for
students in the treatment and comparison schools. On both tests, in both language and math,
the treatment students did better than the comparison students (a 0.16 standard deviation
increase and 0.11 standard deviations in language at the post-test score), even though the
differences are not significant. Since child test scores are strongly auto-correlated, we obtain
greater precision by controlling for the child’s pre-test score level.
35As mentioned earlier, seven centers closed down prior to the start of the program. We made no attempt
to test the children from these centers in the pre-test.
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5.3.2 Test Results
In Table 9, we report the program’s impact on test scores. We compare the average test
scores of students in the treatment and comparison schools, conditional on a child’s pre-
program competency level. In a regression framework, we model the effect of being in a
school j that is being treated (Treatj) on child i’s score (Scoreijk) on test k (where k denotes
either the mid- or post-test exam):
Scoreijk = β1 + β2Treatj + β3 Pre Writij + β4Oral Scoreij + β5 Written Scoreij + εijk. (13)
Since test scores are highly autocorrelated, controlling for a child’s test scores before the pro-
gram increases the precision of our estimate. However, the specific structure of the pre-test
(i.e., there is not one “score” on a comparable scale for each child because the children either
took the written or the oral test in the pre-test) does not allow for a traditional difference-in-
difference (DD) or “value added” (child fixed effect) strategy. Instead, we include a variable
containing the child’s pre-test score for the oral test if he took the oral pre-test and 0 other-
wise (Oral Scoreij), the child’s pre-test score on the written test if he took the written test
and 0 otherwise (Written Scoreij), and an indicator variable for whether he took the written
test at the pre-test (Pre Writij).
36 This fully controls for the child pre-test achievement, and
is thus similar in spirit to a DD strategy. Standard errors are clustered by school. Each cell
in Table 9 represents the treatment effect (β2) obtained in a separate regression. For ease
of interpretation, the mid-test results (Columns 1 to 4) and post-test results (Columns 5 to
8) are expressed in the standard deviation of the distribution of the mid-test score in the
comparison schools.37
The tables reveal that the program had a significant impact on learning, even as early
as the mid-test. Children in treatment schools gained 0.16 standard deviations of the test
score distribution in language, 0.15 standard deviations in math, and 0.17 overall (Panel
A). Including controls for school characteristics—location, teacher test scores, and the in-
frastructure index of school—does not significantly change our findings (Panel B). Children
36At the pre-test, children were given either the oral or the written score. At the mid- and post-test, every
child took the oral part, and every child who could write took the written exam (all children were given a
chance to try the written exam; if they could not read, they were given a zero for the written test).
37Scores are normalized such that the mean and standard deviation of the comparison group at the time
of the mid-test exam is zero and one, respectively. (Specifically, we subtract the mean of the comparison
group in the pre-test, and divide by the standard deviation.) This allows for comparison across samples,
as well as with the results from other studies. We could not normalize with respect to the pre-test score
distribution since not every child took the same test at the pre-test.
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who could write at the time of the pre-test gained the most from the program. For example,
they had mid-line test scores 0.25 standard deviations higher in treatment schools than in
comparison schools (Panel D). Interestingly, the children who could write at the time of the
pre-test do not increase their attendance rate in response to the greater teacher attendance
rate relatively more than those who could not write at the time of the pre-test. Therefore,
it is not that they have relatively more days of schooling than the students who could not
write as a result of the program, but rather that they seem better equipped to make the
most out of the additional days of schooling that they receive.
We compare the program’s impact on girls versus boys in Panels E and F. Girls gained as
much, if not more, from the program as boys. On the mid-test, 7 percentage-points more of
girls in the treatment schools were able to write relative to the comparison schools, compared
to only 2 percentage-points of boys (this five percentage point difference is significant).
The differences between students in the treatment and comparison schools persisted in the
post-test (Columns 5 to 8). Children in treatment schools gained 0.21 standard deviations in
language, 0.16 in math, and 0.17 overall (Panel A). Similar to the mid-test, much of the gains
came from children who could write at the time of the pre-test. The post-test also suggests
that girls gained slightly more from the program than the boys, but these differences are not
significant. The treatment effect of 0.17 standard deviations is similar to other successful
educational interventions, such as the Balsakhi Remedial Education Program in India during
its first year (Banerjee, et al., 2005).
5.3.3 Leaving the NFE
NFEs prepare children, who might not otherwise attend school, to enter government schools
at an age-appropriate grade. To do so, children must demonstrate proficiency either by
passing an exam or through vetting by a government teacher. The ability of his students
to join government schools is, therefore, a strong signal of success for a NFE teacher. The
program increased the graduation rate to the government schools. As shown in Table 10, 26
percent of students in the treatment schools graduated to the government schools, compared
to only 16 percent in the comparison schools (by February 2006). This 10 percentage point
difference implies a 62 percent increase in the graduation rate and is significant.
In the final row of Table 10, we present the dropout rates for children who left school
entirely (i.e. left the NFE and did not join a government school). The dropout rate is slightly
lower for the treatment schools, but this difference is insignificant.
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5.3.4 Estimating the Effect of Teacher Presence on Learning
The previous sections presented the reduced form analysis of the effect of the incentive
program on child learning. Table 11 interprets what these estimates can tell us about the
impact of teacher attendance.38 Columns 1 to 3 report simple correlations between the
teacher attendance rate and the child test scores. Specifically, we report the coefficient
estimate of the number of times a school was found open (Openj) on a regression of either
the mid-test or post-test scores:
Scoreijk = β1 + β2Openj + β3 Pre Writij + β4Oral Scoreij + β5 Written Scoreij + εijk. (14)
We continue to control for the child’s pre-test score and to cluster standard errors by school.
Column 1 reports OLS estimation of Equation 2 for the comparison schools. In this case,
the random check data are used to estimate the number of times a school is found open.
The coefficient is 0.20, indicating that the test scores of children in centers open 100 percent
of the time would be 0.10 standard deviations higher than those of children in a center open
50 percent of the time. Note that this coefficient is insignificant.
This estimate is similar to those reported in other studies (Chaudhury, et al., 2005) and,
taken at face value, would imply that the effect of teacher attendance on learning is not that
large. Chaudhury et al. (2005) conjectures that the measurement of absence rates based
on a few random visits per school has considerable error, and may thus bias the results
downwards. Consistent with this theory, the effect on the post-test scores, where having
more months of random check data allows us to better estimate the absence rate per school,
becomes larger (0.58 standard deviations). Our study provides a more direct test of this
hypothesis since the photograph data gives us the actual attendance of treatment teachers.
We present the OLS estimate of the effect of attendance for treatment teachers using the
random check data (Column 2) and camera data (Column 3). Overall, the effect of teacher
attendance is larger in the treatment schools than the comparison schools (0.39 in Column 2
to 0.20 in Column 1, both obtained with random check data). More interestingly, consistent
with the measurement error hypothesis, the effect of teacher attendance is larger and much
more significant when using the more accurate measure of attendance from the camera data,
especially for the mid-test scores (the estimate is 0.87 standard deviations in the Column
3 as compared to 0.39 in Column 2). For the post-test, where we have a more accurate
38This estimate is the effect of being present at a random check, which combines the effect of having come
at all, and having come for a longer time.
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measure of attendance from the random check data, the results from the two methods are
similar (0.98 in Column 3 versus 1.17 in Column 2).
Finally, in Column 4, we pool both samples and instrument Openj (as measured by the
random check) with the treatment status of the school to obtain exogenous variation in the
percentage of time the school was found open. Since we have shown that the program had
a direct effect on the length of the school day, as well as whether or not the school opened
at all, the 2SLS estimate captures the joint effect of outright absence and of a longer school
day. The 2SLS estimates are higher than the OLS results found in Column 1, and they are
indistinguishable from the OLS results in Column 3, obtained with the precisely measured
absence rate. This suggests that the relatively low correlation between teacher absence and
test scores that was observed in previous studies is indeed likely to be due to measurement
error in the teacher absence data. The more precise IV estimates suggest that even a 10
percentage point reduction in the absence rate would result in a 0.10 standard deviation
increase in child test scores.
Extrapolating these estimates (which must be done with caution, since the local effect
may be different from the overall effect), we can conclude that the effect of being enrolled
in an NFE for a year with a teacher present every day is about one standard deviation.
This point estimate is similar to the effect of attending remedial education classes with a
para-teacher for one year in urban India for children who are enrolled in regular primary
school, but have not yet achieved basic numeracy or literacy (1.12 standard deviations in
Banerjee et al., 2005). Both of these studies therefore suggest that para-teachers can be
effective teachers, at least when an NGO provides them with proper training.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that direct monitoring, combined with simple and credible financial
incentives based on teacher attendance, leads to large increases in attendance among para-
teachers. Absenteeism fell from an average of 42 percent in the comparison schools to 21
percent in the treatment schools, without affecting the teachers’ effort while in school. As a
result, the students in treatment schools benefited from about 30 percent more instruction
time. The program had an economically significant impact on test scores: after one year,
child test scores in program schools were 0.17 standard deviations higher than in comparison
schools. Children were also much more likely to be admitted to government schools.
This paper contributes to a small but growing literature that exploits both structural
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modeling and carefully controlled randomized experiments to answer an economic question.
On the substantive front, our results suggest that providing incentives for attendance in
non-formal schools can increase learning levels. However, the question arises as to whether
incentive programs can be instituted for government teachers, who tend to be politically
powerful. It may prove difficult to institute a system in which they would be monitored daily
using a camera or similar device. However, our findings suggest that the barriers currently
preventing teachers from attending school regularly (e.g., distance, other activities) are not
insurmountable. Given political will, it is possible that solutions to the absence problem
could be found in government schools as well.39
A recent experiment demonstrates the external validity of these results outside the NGO
context (Banerjee, Duflo and Glennerster, 2007). Following the results of the cameras pro-
gram, the government of Rajasthan created a similar system for government nurses, whose
absence rate was about 44 percent. The nurses were monitored using time and date stamps.
The announced incentive system was severe: it called for a 50 percent reduction in the pay
of nurses who were absent 50 percent of the time, and termination of persistently absent
nurses. In the first few months, when these punishments were carried out, the program
lead to about a 50 percent reduction in absenteeism. However, after a few months, the
government started granting a large number of “exemptions” (although the monitoring did
continue). The absence rate in the treatment group quickly converged to that of the control
group. This further confirms that monitoring is effective, but only when coupled with real
incentives, as is suggested by the results of our structural model.
The program for nurses suggests that barriers exist to the implementation of incentive
systems for government employees. However, our findings also imply that para-teachers can
be effective. If implementing monitoring within the government system turns out to be
impossible, our results provide support for the policy of increasing teaching staff through
the hiring of para-teachers.
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Treatment Control Difference
(1) (2) (3)
School Open 0.66 0.64 0.02
(0.11)
41 39 80
Number of Students Present 17.71 15.92 1.78
(2.31)
27 25 52
Teacher Test Scores 34.99 33.54 1.44
(2.02)
53 54 107
0.83 0.84 0.00
(0.09)
27 25 52
0.78 0.72 0.06
(0.12)
27 25 52
Blackboards Utilized 0.85 0.89 -0.04
(0.11)
20 19 39
Fstat(1,110) 1.21
p-value (0.27)
Took Written Exam 0.17 0.19 -0.02
(0.04)
1136 1094 2230
Total Score on Oral Exam -0.08 0.00 -0.08
(0.07)
940 888 1828
Total Score on Written Exam 0.16 0.00 0.16
(0.19)
196 206 402
Table 1:  Baseline Data
Percent of Teachers Interacting with Students
Percentage of Children Sitting Within Classroom
Notes:  (1) Teacher Performance Measures from Random Checks only includes schools that were open 
during the random check. (2)  Children who could write were given a written exam.  Children who 
could not write were given an oral exam.  (3) Standard errors are clustered by school.
A.  Teacher Attendance
B.  Student Participation (Random Check)
C. Teacher Qualifications
D.  Teacher Performance Measures (Random Check)
E.  Baseline Test Scores
Note:  (1) The program began in September 2003.  August only includes the 80 schools checked before announcement of program.  September includes all 
random checks between August 25 through the end of September.  (2) Child learning levels were assessed in a mid-test (April 2004) and a post-test (November 
2004). After the post-test, the "official" evaluation period ended.  Random checks continued in both the treatment and control schools.
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Figure 1:  Percentage of Schools Open during Random Checks
Treatment
Control
Mid-Test Post-Test
Treatment Control Diff Until Mid-Test Mid to Post Test After Post Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.79 0.58 0.21 0.20 0.17 0.23
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
1575 1496 3071 882 660 1529
0.78 0.63 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)
843 702 1545 423 327 795
0.78 0.53 0.24 0.21 0.14 0.32
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
625 757 1382 412 300 670
Figure 2:  Impact of the Cameras
(out of at least 25 visits)
Notes:  (1)  Child learning levels were assessed in a mid-test (April 2004) and a post-test 
(November 2004). After the post-test, the "official" evaluation period was ended.  Random 
checks continued in both the treatment and control schools.  (2) Standard errors are clustered 
by school.  (3) Panels B and C only include the 109 schools where teacher tests were 
available.
Table 2:  Teacher Attendance
Sept 2003-Feb 2006                                                                                                  Difference Between Treatment and Control Schools
A.  All Teachers
B.  Teachers with Above Median Test Scores
C.  Teachers with Below Median Test Scores
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Treatment
Control
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Beginning of Month 0.19 0.12 0.46 0.39
(0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03)
In the Money 0.52 0.37 0.6 0.48
(0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01)
Beginning of the Month * In the Money -0.19 -0.12 -0.34 -0.3
(0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.02)
Observations 2813 2813 27501 27501
R-squared 0.06 0.22 0.08 0.16
Sample 1st and last 
day of month
1st and last 
day of month
1st 10 and last 
10 days of 
month
1st 10 and last 
10 days of 
month
Third Order Polynomial on Days on each side X X
Teacher Fixed Effects X X
Month Fixed Effects X X
Clustered Standard Errors X X
Note:  (1) The dependent variable in all models is an indicator variable for whether the teacher worked 
on a particular day, as measured by the photographs for the treatment schools.  
Table 3 :  Do Teachers Work More When They are "In the Money"?
Figure 3:  RDD Representation of Teacher Attendance at the Start and End of the Month
Note:  (1) The top lines represent the months in which the teacher is in the money, while the bottom lines represent the 
months in which the teacher not in the money. (2) The estimation includes a third order polynomial of days on the left and 
right side of the change of month.
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Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII
Parameter (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
β 0.049 0.027 0.055 0.057 0.013 0.017 0.017 0.016
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
µ1 1.564 1.777 1.778 -0.428 -0.304 -0.160 -0.108
(0.013) (0.013) (0.021) (0.045) (0.042) (0.092) (0.057)
ρ 0.422 0.412 0.449
(0.030) (0.021) (0.043)
σ1
2 0.043 0.007 0.252 0.418 0.235
(0.012) (0.019) (0.015) (0.052) (0.028)
µ2 1.781
(0.345)
σ2
2 0.050
(0.545)
p 0.024
(0.007)
Yesterday Shifter 0.094 0.024 0.095
(0.010) (0.009) (0.014)
Attendance -0.132
(0.095)
Test Score -0.005
(0.002)
Heterogeneity None FE None RC RC RC RC RC
Three day Window No No No No No No Yes No
LLH 10269.13 9932.71 9286.03 3320.70 9287.33
ϵBonus 1.09 0.592 1.299 1.82 0.196 0.298 0.279 0.283
(0.147) (0.062) (0.123) (0.136) (0.053) (0.026) (0.038) (0.064)
ϵbonus_cutoff -18.26 -1.90 -16.94 -14.07 -0.14 -0.074 -0.454 -0.100
(2.023) (0.564) (0.889) (1.609) (0.144) (0.050) (0.252) (0.137)
Predicted Days Worked 17.23 17.30 16.87 16.28 16.75 18.381 17.596 18.213
(0.361) (0.153) (0.260) (0.566) (0.391) (0.391) (0.809) (0.974)
Days Worked BONUS=0 1.31 6.96 1.35 1.174 12.90 9.774 11.314 10.605
(0.041) (0.101) (0.049) (0.072) (0.281) (0.605) (0.916) (1.454)
Out of Sample Prediction 21.47 19.975 21.48 21.550 17.77 20.157 19.281 19.948
(0.046) (0.164) (0.030) (0.060) (0.479) (0.287) (0.753) (0.678)
Table 4:  Results from the Structural Model
Note:  Models I, II, VI, VII, and VIII are estimated using maximum likelihood.  Models III, IV, and V are estimated using the 
method of simulated moments with an optimal weighting matrix.  We report the elasticity of days worked with respect to the 
bonus, ϵBonus, and the semi-elasticity with respect to a bonus cutoff, ϵBonus_cutoff.  The last three rows report the expected 
number of days worked under the original incentives, a counterfactual where BONUS=0, and the second set of financial 
incentives
Figure 4A:  Predicted Fit From Model V
Figure 4B:  CounterFactual Fit From Model V
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Model V -- Predicted Fit
Actual Mean 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile
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Model V -- Counterfactual Fit
Actual Mean 2.5 Percentile 97.5 Percentile
Treatment Control Diff Until Mid-Test Mid to Post Test After Post Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
0.72 0.73 -0.01 0.01 0.04 -0.01
(0.01) (0.89) (0.03) (0.02)
1239 867 2106 643 480 983
0.55 0.57 -0.02 -0.02 0.05 -0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03)
1239 867 2106 643 480 983
Blackboards Utilized 0.92 0.93 -0.01 -0.03 0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
990 708 1698 613 472 613
Notes:  (1) Teacher Performance Measures from Random Checks only includes schools that were open during the random check. (2) 
Standard errors are clustered by school. 
Table 6:  Teacher Performance
Sept 2003-Feb 2006                                                                                                  
Percent of Teachers Interacting with 
Students
Percent of Children Sitting Within 
Classroom 
Difference Between Treatment and Control Schools
Expected Days 
Worked
Bonus 
Cutoff Bonus
Expected 
Cost
Test Score Gain 
over Control Group 
(13 days)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
14 0 0 500 0.04
15 21 25 521 0.07
16 22 75 664 0.11
17 21 75 672 0.15
18 20 75 755 0.18
19 20 100 921 0.22
20 20 125 1112 0.26
21 16 225 2642 0.29
22 11 275 4604 0.33
Table 5: Counterfactual Cost-Minimizing Policies
Treatment Control Diff Until Mid-Test Mid to Post Test After Post Test
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Attendance of Students Present at Pre-Test Exam 0.46 0.46 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
23495 16280 39775
Attendance for Children who did not leave NFE 0.62 0.58 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
12956 10737 23693
Presence for Students Present at Pre-Test Exam 0.37 0.28 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)
29489 26695 56184
Presence for Student who did not leave NFE 0.50 0.36 0.13 0.10 0.13 0.15
(0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
16274 17247 33521
Took Oral Pre-Test 0.50 0.36 0.14 0.11 0.14 0.15
(0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
14778 14335 29113
Took Written Pre-Test 0.48 0.39 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.11
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
1496 2912 4408
Table 7:  Child Attendance
Sept 03-Feb 06                                  Difference Between Treatment and Control Schools
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are clustered at the level of the school. (2) Child attendance data were collected during random checks.  (3) The 
attendance at the pre-test exam determined the child enrollment at the start of the program.
A. Attendance Conditional on School Open
B.  Total Instruction Time (Presence)
C.  Presence, by Student Learning Level at Program Start (for those who did not leave)
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Percent Attrition 0.11 0.22 -0.10 0.24 0.21 0.03
(0.05) (0.04)
Difference in Percent Written of Pre-Test attriters-stayers 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.06 -0.03 0.10
(0.06) (0.06)
Difference in Verbal Test of Pre-Test attriters-stayers 0.05 0.08 -0.03 0.02 0.12 -0.10
(0.14) (0.14)
Difference in Written Test of Pre-Test attriters-stayers -0.41 -0.23 -0.18 -0.19 -0.13 -0.06
(0.34) (0.29)
Took Written 0.36 0.33 0.03 0.61 0.57 0.04
(0.04) (0.05)
Math 0.14 0.00 0.14 -0.08 -0.24 0.16
(0.10) (0.15)
Language 0.14 0.00 0.14 1.71 1.60 0.11
(0.10) (0.11)
Total 0.14 0.00 0.14 0.35 0.24 0.12
(0.10) (0.11)
Notes:  (1) Test Scores in Panel B are normalized by the mean of the mid-test control.  (2) Standard Errors are clustered by school.
B.  Exam Score Means
Mid Test Post Test
Table 8:  Descriptive Statistics for Mid Test and Post Test
A.  Attrition Process
Math Lang Total Math Lang Total
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
0.04 0.15 0.16 0.17 0.06 0.21 0.16 0.17
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.12) (0.08) (0.09)
1893 1893 1893 1893 1760 1760 1760 1760
0.04 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.06 0.18 0.14 0.15
(0.03) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) 0.13 0.08 0.09
1752 1752 1752 1752 1760 1760 1760 1760
0.14 0.13 0.15 0.2 0.13 0.16
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.10)
1550 1550 1550 1454 1454 1454
0.19 0.28 0.25 0.28 0.28 0.25
(0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.18) (0.11) (0.12)
343 343 343 306 306 306
0.07 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.07 0.22 0.13 0.17
(0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.12) 0.08 (0.09)
876 876 876 876 811 811 811 811
0.02 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.05 0.20 0.15 0.16
(0.04) (0.09) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.15) (0.10) (0.10)
983 983 983 983 926 926 926 926
A.  All Children
Table 9:  Estimation of Treatment Effects for the Mid- and Post-Test 
Mid-Test Post-Test
Took 
Written
Took 
Written
B.  With Controls
C.  Took Pre-Test Oral
D.  Took Pre-Test Written
E.  Girls
Notes: (1) The table presents the coefficient estimate of being in a treated school on the sum of a child's score on the 
oral and written exams.  All regressions include controls for the child's learning levels prior to the program.  (2) The 
mid and post test scores are normalized by mid test control group. (3) Controls in Row B include Block, Teacher Test 
Scores, and Infrastructure Index.  (4) Standard errors are clustered by school. 
F.  Boys
Treatment Control Diff
(1) (2) (3)
0.44 0.36 0.08
(0.04)
0.26 0.16 0.10
(0.03)
0.18 0.20 -0.02
(0.03)
N 1136 1061 2197
Method: OLS OLS OLS 2SLS
Sample: Control Schools Treatment Schools Treatment Schools All Schools
Data: Random Check Random Check Photographs Random Check
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Took Written 0.02 0.28 0.36 0.26
(0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.19)
Total Score 0.20 0.39 0.87 1.07
(0.19) (0.21) (0.22) (0.43)
N 878 1015 1015 1893
Took Written 0.31 0.51 0.59 0.33
(0.15) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22)
Total Score 0.58 1.17 0.98 0.97
(0.35) (0.36) (0.53) (0.47)
N 883 877 877 1760
A.  Mid-test (Sept 03-April 04)
B. Post-test (Sept 03 -Oct 04)
Notes: (1) The table presents the coefficient estimate of the teacher's attendance on the sum of a child's score 
on the oral and written exams.  All regressions include controls for the child's learning levels prior to the 
program.  (2) The mid and post test scores are normalized by the mid test control group. (3) Standard errors 
are clustered by school. 
Notes:  (1) Standard errors are clustered at the level of the school. (2) Dropouts are defined as  those who 
were absent for the last five random checks in which a school was found open.
Table 10:  Dropouts and Movement into Government Schools
Child Left NFE
Child Enrolled in Government 
School
Child Dropped Out of School
Table 11:  Does the Random Check Predict Test Scores?
